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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
O·F THE STATE OF UT'AH 
JENSEN'S USED CARS, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
JAMES T. RICE, 
.A.ppellwnt. 
Case 
No. 8741 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Some time prior to August 12, 1955, the Defendant 
and Appellant, James T. Rice ordered a 1955 Ford Main-
line automobile from Plaintiff and Respondent. When 
said automobile was delivered to Appellant by Respond-
ent's agent on either the 12th or 13th day of August, 1955, 
Appellant gave Respondent's agent a check in the amount 
of $200.00, dated August 13, 1955, drawn on the Valley 
State Bank and made payable to the Respondent, Jensen's 
Used Cars. Said check was a down payment on said auto-
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mobile, the balance of the purchase price to be subse-
quently arranged for and paid to Respondent by Appel-
lant. Then on August 18, 1955, Appellant went to the 
First National Bank of Murray, Utah, where financing 
had been arranged for, and executed a promissory note 
and conditional sale contract on said automobile payable 
to Respondent Jensen's Used Cars at the First National 
Bank of Murray. (See Ex. 2 and 3) The contract and 
note were fully prepared and completed at the time they 
were signed and delivered by Appellant and provided for 
payment of a balance in the sum of TWO THOUSAND 
FORTY-FIVE AND 70/100 ($2,045.70) DOLLARS in in-
stallments of not less than $68.19 per month beginning 
October 2, 1955. The contract provided for an unpaid cash 
price balance of $1,650.00 plus time-price differential and 
other charges, bringing the time balance to $2,045. 70. 
Appellant retained possession of the automobile until No-
vember 9, 1955, some three months after its purchase, 
when it was repossessed by an agent of the First National 
Bank of Murray due to the failure of Appellant to pay the 
installments provided for in the promissory note. No 
payments have ever been made by Appellant on the note 
and he stopped payment on the $200.00 down-payment 
check, according to his ow11 testimony (R. p. 68) and has 
never paid the check or any part thereof. In fact, there 
were not sufficient funds on deposit in Appellant's account 
at Valley State Bank to haYe paid said check at the time 
it was presented or for some five or six "'"eeks thereafter, 
even if payment had not been stopped. (R., bottom p. 29 
and top of p. 25) 
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The repossessed automobile vvas re-sold by Respond-
ent for $1,180.00 and this action was brought by Respond-
ent to recover the deficiency of $965.70 on said note, plus 
interest, and to recover the amount of the $200.00 check 
given as a down payment. The Court directed a verdict in 
favor of Respondent for the amount of the deficiency on 
the note and submitted the issue as to the $200.00 check 
and the attorney's fees to the jury. The jury found the 
issues in favor of Respondent on the $200.00 check and 
a·\Yarded Respondent $175.00 attorney's fees. Defendant 
appeals and asks that the judgment be reversed or that 
the cause be remanded for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE PROMISSORY NOTE IN SUIT SPEAKS 
FOR ITSELF, BEING UNAMBIGUOUS AND 
CLEAR AND REGULAR ON ITS FAC'E, AND 
HAVING BEEN SUPPORTED BY VALUABLE 
CONSIDERATION IN THE FORM OF AN AUTO-
MOBILE IT' C'ANNOT BE ALTERED OR VARIED 
BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
PoiNT II. 
THERE WAS NO LACK OF MEETING OF THE 
MINDS WITH RESPECT T'O THE PROMISSORY 
NOTE OR CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT. 
PoiNT III. 
THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF F'ACT TO BE 
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SUBMITrED TO THE JURY REGARDING THE 
FOLLOWING: 
(a) THE ACTUAL EXECUTION AND CON-
SUMMATION OF THE NOTE AND 
CONTRACT. 
(b) THE QUESTION OF FAILURE OF GO·N-
SIDERATION. 
PoiNT IV. 
IF THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE. JURY AFTER ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL, 
SUCH ERROR, IF ANY, WAS WAIVED BY STIPU-
LATION AND ACQUIESCENC'E OF DEFENDANT 
AND COUNSEL. 
PoiNT V. 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO ADMIT 
EXHIBITS 8 AND 9 WAS NOT IN ERROR AND 
WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
PoiNT VI. 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COM-
PLAlNT FOR FAILURE· TO STATE A CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
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ARGUMENT 
It is apparent that a great quantity of extraneous 
matter has been injected into this case, both at the trial 
and in Appellant's Brief. 
PoiNT I. 
THE PR.OMISS.OR.Y NOTE IN SUIT SP'EAKS 
FOR ITSELF, BEING UNAMBIGUOUS AND 
CLEAR AND REGULAR ON ITS FACE, AND 
HAVING BEEN SUPPORTED BY VALUABLE 
CONSIDERATION IN THE FORM OF AN AUTO.., 
MOBILE IT c·ANNOT BE ALTERED OR VARIED 
BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
To begin with, this case concerns principally the Ap-
pellant's liability on the promissory note given as evi-
dence of debt for the purchase of an automobile. The car-
dinal rule of construction of any written contract is to 
ascertain the intention of the parties. To ascertain this 
intention, resort is first had to the language of the instru-
ment; if such language appears to be perfectly plain and 
capable of a legal construction, then the force and effect to 
be given to the contract must be determined by its terms 
and a different construction from that imported by its 
terms cannot be obtained by the use of extrinsic evidence. 
(See 7 Am. Jur. Bills and Notes, Sec. 49, P. 815) The 
parol evidence rule, long regarded as a rule of evidence, 
has now come to be regarded rather as a rule of sub-
stantive law. In addition to the fact that the clear, com-
plete and unambiguous note speaks for itself, the Appel-
lant's own testimony at the trial shows a clear intention at 
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the time of the signing of the note to bind himself for the 
payment of the face amount of the note by the install-
ments and according to the terms provided for therein. 
(R., p. 92) 
PorNT II. 
THERE WAS NO LACK OF MEETING OF THE 
MINDS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROMISSORY 
NOTE OR CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT. 
There can be no question as to the lack of a meeting 
of the minds in the execution of the contract because of 
any dispute as to the total purchase price of the automo-
bile, since Appellant had already, the day before the 
execution of the note, stopped payment on the $200.00 
down-payment check, thus preventing Respondent from 
obtaining payment of the $200.00, and with full knowledge 
of this fact signed a note for an amount less than the 
amount "\vhich he admits was the agreed price of the car, 
and \vhich price he admitted at the trial he intended to 
pay. (R .. , p. 70) At that point he could have elected not 
to sign the note and contract and returned the auto-
mobile to Respondent or \Yaited until the alleged diffi-
culty was ironed out, but instead he elected to keep the 
automobile and to bind hin1self for the payment of the 
amount of the note irrespectiYe of any possible dispute 
ovc•r \vha t portion of the amount of the check \Yas due and 
pa~ra.ble to the Respondent. 
Sc_letious 19 and 20, 12 1\.m. J ur., Contracts, p. 515 
on the question of "meeting of the minds," or mutual 
HNSPUt, reads as fo}lO\YR: 
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'' 19. Generally. Although it is frequently said 
that there must be mutual assent or a meeting of 
the minds, it seems that ordinarily no more is 
meant than that an expression of mutual assent is 
necessary to form a contract. It is sometimes said 
that mutual assent is conclusively presumed from 
an expression of mutual assent. It is also some-
times said that although mlitual assent is neces-
sary, in certain cases the parties are estopped to 
deny that their words or acts accurately express 
their actual intent. It seems preferable, however, 
to state than an expression of mutual assent is nec-
essary and is ordinarily alone sufficient, anything 
further being ordinarily unneceessary to form a 
contract. The entry of the parties into a con-
tractual relationship must be manifested by some 
intelligible conduct, act or sign. The apparent mu-
tual assent of the parties, essential to the forma-
tion of a contract, must be gathered from their 
outward expressions and acts, and not from an 
unexpressed intention. It is said that the meeting 
of minds, which is essential to the formation of a 
contract, is not determined by the secret inten-
tions of the parties, but by their expressed inten-
tions, which may be wholly at variance with the 
former. The question whether a contract has been 
made must be determined from a consideration of 
the expressed intention of the parties - that is, 
from a consideration of their words and acts. In 
some jurisdictions it is provided by statute that a 
voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transac-
tion is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations 
arising from it so far as the facts are known or 
ought to be known to the person accepting. 
The expression of intention must be promis-
sory and contractual in its nature. Therefore, a 
transaction does not constitute a contract if it is 
entered into by way of frolic and banter. 
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20. Binding Effect of Words and Acts. One 
who offers or accepts a contract of a certain char-
acter is bound by its terms as properly interpreted, 
even though he meant something different and 
thought the words conveyed his meaning It has 
been said that the court must give effect to the 
meaning and intention of the parties as expressed 
in the language of their contract, in the absence of 
anything to show legal impediment to pevent their 
entering into any contract they see fit or their ex-
pressing it in the language of their own choice. 
Accordingly, one who accepts a written obligation 
is conclusively bound by its terms. Parties who 
have reduced their agreement to writing in plain, 
unequivocal terms or in terms susceptible of in-
terpretation and construction under recognized 
rules of law are bound by the meaning of the 
contract which is reached by a proper in-
terpretation .... '' 
Be that as it may, the question of the alleged lack of 
meeting of the minds is not in issue in this case, since it 
was not raised in the pleadings. The only defenses al-
leged in the Answer were that the note and contract sued 
upon were never executed, the Defendant allegedly having 
only signed some other instrument in blank; that the con-
sideration failed ''hen the car ''as voluntarily returned 
by Defendant to Plaintiff; and that Plaintiff agreed to can-
cel the contract. All these alleged defenses are dealt with 
elsewhere in this brief; but with regard to cancellation, it 
seems that an allegation of c.ancellation admits and pre-
supposes n completed contract, thus refuting the first 
alleged defense. The simple fac.t remains that a clear, 
complete and unambiguous note and contract were exe-
cuted by Appellant, and as consideration therefor he had 
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and retained possession of a nearly new 1955 Ford auto-
mobile and continued to hold possession of said automo-
bile, driving it some 1,800 miles before it was repossessed 
(R., p. 40 and p. 56) and even attempting to sell the auto-
mobile (R., p. 64), clearly evidencing an understanding on 
his part that he was obligated for the purchase price of 
the automobile. 
PorNT III. 
THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF FACT TO BE 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY REGARDING THE 
FOLL.OWING: 
(a) THE ACTUAL EXECUTIO·N AND CON-
SUMMATIO,N OF THE NOTE· AND 
CONTRACT. 
(b) THE QUESTION OF FAILURE O,F CON-
SIDERATION. 
There could be no question to be presented to the jury 
as to the execution of the contract by Defendant being 
conditional upon the return of the check, or any part 
thereof, since Defendant had already made it impossible 
for the check to be paid, so that there was nothing to be 
paid to Defendant by Plaintiff under any circumstances, 
even under the interpretation most favorable to the De-
fendant. The only possible question was as to how much 
of the $200.00 was owing to Plaintiff, since Defendant ad-
mitted several times during his testimony that the price 
of the automobile was to be not less than $1,700.00, plus 
license and taxes. (R., p. 71 and p. 84) The Defendant 
even offered to pay $100.00 of the $200.00. (R., p. 106) 
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This issue was properly submitted to the jury and re-
solved in favor of Plaintiff. 
The Court did not err in failing to present to the jury 
the issue as to the execution and consummation of the 
note and contract since the Defendant admitted the execu-
tion of the instruments, R., p. 102) receipt of considera-
tion, (R., p. 71) and his intent to be bound by the contract, 
(R., p. 70) and did not introduce any evidence to the con-
trary. Thus the Court, upon considering the evidence, 
properly determined that there was no issue to be pre-
sented to the jury on this point. 
The Court did not err in failing to present to the jury 
the question of failure of consideration due to the auto-
mobile having been returned to Plaintiff, since the Answer 
of the Defendant did not allege failure of consideration 
due to the return of the automobile but only due to the 
alleged agreement of the Plaintiff to cancel the contract. 
Furthermore, the evidence clearly showed that the car 
was not voluntarily returned but ,, ... as repossessed after 
default. (R., p. 55) As to cancellation, Defendant ad-
mitted in his testimony (R., p. 102) that Plaintiff never 
agreed to cancel the note or contract and ne\er notified 
Defendant or advised him that it would cancel said 
instruments. 
It may be that counsel for Appellant has confused 
the facts of this case \Yith the rule that " ... here a promis-
sory note is giYen as paynze1d of property under the con-
ditional sale contract and the property is returned and 
accepted, the consideration fails. Ho,, ... ever, the first pro-
vision 011 the reYerse side of the ('iouditional Sale Contract 
10 
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(Ex. 3) provides, "The delivery of the promissory note 
by the purchaser to the Seller or negotiation of sale 
thereof by the Seller shall not be deemed payment of the 
purchase price.'' Therefore, the rule referred to does not 
apply in this case on account of the repossession of the 
automobile. Appellant has not pleaded any other basis 
upon which a failure of consideration could be construed 
and therefore there was no issue concerning this point to 
be presented to the jury. 
PoiNT IV. 
IF THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE. JURY AFTER ARGUMENT OF C'OUNSEL, 
SUCH ERR.OR, IF ANY, WAS WAIVED BY STIPU-
LATION AND ACQUIESC'ENCE OF DEFENDANT 
AND COUNSEL. 
Appellant claims that the Court erred in instructing 
the jury after argument of counsel and allowing the attor-
ney for the Plaintiff to discuss the instructions in front of 
the jury, which Appellant claims granted them in effect 
a contradictory instruction. It is somewhat understand-
able that Mr. Bettilyon's thinking on this point might be 
less than clear since he was not the attorney who han-
dled the case at the trial and was not present at the trial. 
However, the record discloses, in part, that Defendant's 
counsel, Mr. Barclay, in the presence of the Defendant, 
stipulated and agreed to the correction of the previously 
erroneous instruction, and even where the transcript 
does not show his express stipulation, his mere acquies-
cence and failure to object would serve as a waiver of 
any such alleged error. Further, the final instruction 
11 
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given to the jurors with respect to the special interroga-
tory conce.rning the $200.00 check was clear and would 
serve to clarify and resolve any confusion in the mind 
of any person of ordinary intelligence, in addition to 
which the written form of the special interrogatory was 
especially clear and unambiguous and clearly stated the 
correct issue, as admitted by Mr. Barclay on Page 100 of 
the Transcript. (R., p. 122) If there was any error in the 
Court's action it was not prejudicial to Defendant, even 
had it not been waived by acquiescence and stipulation. 
PoiNT V. 
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO ADMIT 
EXHIBITS 8 AND 9 WAS NOT IN ERROR AND 
WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Appellant contends that the Court erred in failing to 
allow Defendant to introduce Exhibits 8 and 9. Exhibit 8, 
it is submitted, is immaterial, being only a demand di-
rected by Plaintiff's attorney to Defendant for payment 
of the $200.00 check on account of its having been re-
turned by the bank for insufficient funds. Exhibit 9 was 
properly excluded because in part it contained a self-
serving statement by which Defendant, by the extrinsic 
evidence would endeavor to Yary the terms of the written 
contract. However, Defendant was not prejudiced by its 
exclusion as an exhibit, since it contains damaging ad-
missions by Defendant as to Defendant's liability on the 
$200.00 check in addition to the contract bal'3.nce. Also, 
the record will show that part of the import of the letter 
was introduced b~T Defendant's testimony on cross-exami-
nation and by representations of Defendant's counsel. 
12 
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PoiNT VI. 
THE COURT PROPERLY R.EFUS.ED TO GRANT 
DE.FENDANT''S MOTIO·N TO DISMISS THE COM-
PLAINT FOR FAILURE· TO STATE A CAUSE OF 
ACTIO·N. 
With respect to Appellant's allegation that the Court 
erred in refusing to grant Defendant's l\!Iotion to Dismiss 
on the grounds that the Complaint failed to state a claim 
against Defendant upon which relief could be granted, Re-
spondent submits this question to the Court, since it is 
clear that the Complaint clearly stated a claim against the 
Defendant upon which relief could be granted, and no 
evidence or argument was offered by Defendant on this 
question. 
Appellant in his Brief on Page 19, Paragraph 5, con-
tends that since there was a $10.00 discrepancy between 
the testimony of Mr. Hunsaker concerning the proceeds 
of the sale of the automobile at auction and the figure 
specified in Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories, this 
question should have been submitted to the jury, and that 
the Court erred in using the figures of the Plaintiff. How-
ever, a recomputation of the figures will show that the 
credit of $1,080.00 was allowed, rather than the smaller 
credit of $1,070.00, which gave the Defendant the benefit 
of the $10.00 discrepancy, and was certainly not preju-
dicial. Also, it should be noted that Defendant's attorney, 
Mr. Barclay, (R. p. 104) stipulated as to the propriety 
of the credit allowed, as reflected in Plaintiff's Complaint, 
and no issue was ever raised by Defendant as to the 
amount of the resale price of the car at the auction. 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hence, there was no issue in this regard to be presented 
to the jury. It should be noted that Mr. Bettilyon, on Page 
13 of Appellant's Brief, infers that this Stipulation by Mr. 
Barclay was based on a misunderstanding on Mr. Bar-
clay's part as to whether the Court had reference to the 
original sale price of the automobile when sold to Defend-
ant or to the resale of the automobile at the auction. How-
ever, a further examination of the record at that point 
will reveal that the Court made it completely clear and 
understandable as to which sale :figure was meant. 
In addition to all the foregoing, it should be noted 
that not only did testimony of the Defendant on cross-ex-
amination fail to support the allegations contained in his 
Answer; hut also, the Defendant actually failed to put on 
any evidence at all, having rested at the end of Plaintiff's 
case in chief. The Defendant and Appellant clearly failed 
to sustain the burden of his defense. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of all the foregoing, the judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiff and against the Defendant should be affirmed 
in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. E. BRADFORD and 
C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
65 East 4th South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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